Introduction
This paper studies the dynamic implications of monetary policy making by committee. The subject matter is important because, in many countries, monetary policy decisions are made by committees, rather than by one individual alone. For example, Fry et al. (2000) report that in a sample of 88 central banks, 79 use some form of committee structure to formulate monetary policy.
In particular, this paper focuses on a two-person committee where heterogenous agents must select the value of the policy instrument (say, the nominal interest rate) but face exogenous uncertainty regarding their preferred policies in the future. The committee members di er in two ways. First, agents have di erent state-dependent preferences over policy. There are states of nature where agents do not agree in their preferred instrument value, and states where they agree. Second, agents di er in their institutional role. More concretely, one agent, the chairman or agenda setter, makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to the other agent in every period. This assumption captures the idea that chairmen usually have more power and influence than their peers as a result of additional legal responsibilities, statutory prerogatives, or prestige. The identity of the chairman and the composition of the committee are assumed to be fixed over time. An important and plausible feature of the voting game is that the instrument value decided in the previous meeting is the default option in case the proposal is rejected in the current meeting. Hence, the current status quo is a state variable.
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In this setup, the first-best policy (that is, the state-contingent program that a benevolent social planner would choose) prescribes the policy preferred by both agents in states of agreement and optimal risk-sharing in states of disagreement. However, since the implementation of this optimal plan requires commitment, it is not surprising that the politico-economic equilibrium cannot implement the first-best policy in the absence of a commitment technology. Instead, the politico-economic equilibrium features ine cient policy choices in all states of nature. First, in states of agreement, committee members do not select their common preferred policy. The reason is that forward-looking policy makers realize that current decisions a ect future voting outcomes by changing the default option in the next meeting. Hence, in choosing the current policy, committee members trade-o the benefit of selecting their preferred policy for this period and the cost of a ecting their bargaining power in future states of disagreement. Simulations show that this form of "political failure" (to borrow does not predict interest rate autocorrelation. 4 Since interest rates are serially correlated in the data, lagged interest rates are usually appended to the Taylor rule in empirical work. As a result of policy inertia, the policy variable in this model changes less often than the state of nature and, consequently, the path of the former is smoother than that of the latter. A similar result whereby committee decision making induces policy smoothing has been derived by Waller (2000) in a model with partisan central bank appointments and exogenous electoral outcomesà la Alesina (1987) . In our model, policy smoothing is not sustained by the strategic appointment of moderate committee members (as in Waller's model) or by trigger punishments (as in Alesina's model), but is instead the result of the voting game played by the committee. Moreover, in the above literature, policy smoothing is regarded as welfare increasing because it reduces the uncertainty associated with elections. Thus, a constant policy rule, irrespective of the identity of the winning party, is beneficial to both parties. In our model, preferred policies are not constant but instead vary over time as the state of nature changes. As a result, a constant policy is not optimal and policy inertia moves the economy away from the e cient frontier.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the committee and solves a simple two-state model that illustrates the main implications of the voting game. Section 3 solves and simulates a more general multi-state model. Section 4 compares the voting model with an endogenous and a fixed default. Section 5 concludes.
Two-State Model
This section describes the committee and examines a version of the dynamic voting game with two states of nature. The two-state model is solved for three horizons, namely T = 1, 2 and . The finite horizon cases (T = 1, 2) are solved analytically by backward induction and the infinite horizon case (T = ) is solved numerically. Studying the two-state model first helps develop the reader's intuition by illustrating some of our results in the simplest possible setup.
The committee is composed of two agents with heterogenous preferences: C and P, where C is the fixed chairman.
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In every period, the committee is concerned with selecting the policy variable x that takes values in the interval [a, c] , with a < c. To make this more 4 An exception is Woodford (2003) where a motive for interest-rate smoothing is explicitly introduced into the central bank's objective function. 5 The assumption of a fixed agenda setter is made for the sake of realism. For example, in the case of the United States, the chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee is (by tradition) the chairman of the Board of Governors, who in turn is appointed by the President for a renewable four-year term. For models of legislative bargaining where the the agenda setter is randomly selected, see Baron (1996) and Baron and Ferjohn (1989) . [3] concrete, think of the policy variable as the target value of a key nominal interest rate. In each period, the payo of policy maker j, for j = C, P , is
where r j ( ) is j's state-dependent preferred policy and is an exogenous shock. For analytical convenience, it is assumed that the probability distribution of is discrete. In this section, it is also assumed that can take only two values, 1 and 2 . The shock follows a Markov chain and its transition matrix has elements p ki = prob( k | i ) (0, 1) with i, k = 1, 2 and . When = 1 , agents C and P disagree in their preferred instrument values, with c and a their respective preferred points.
6 When = 2 , C and P agree and b (a, c) is their preferred point. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that the bliss points are evenly spaced, meaning that b a = c b.
Each committee member ranks policy sequences according to the expected utility they deliver. The intertemporal utility of member j is
where
(0, 1) is the discount factor, which is the same for both players. Note that preferences depend on the policy instrument rather than on policy outcomes (say, inflation and unemployment). This approach has two advantages. First, it makes the voting game more tractable because otherwise the private sector's expectations would be a state variable that has to be validated in a rational expectations equilibrium.
7 Second, it means that the particular economic model that the policy maker believes to be true need not be specified. This is important because anecdotal evidence suggests that policy makers may have di erent views about how the economy works depending on their background and intellectual environment. For example, Hetzel (1998) Before discussing how the committee makes decisions, we derive the benchmark first-best. Let x i denote the optimal policy when the state of nature i has occurred, with i = 1, 2. The first-best (x 1 , x 2 ) is given by (x, b), where x is any policy in the interval [a, c]. The fact that x 2 = b is obvious. To see that x 1 can be any instrument value in the interval [a, c], recall that members' preferences are opposite when = 1 takes place and, consequently, it is not possible to Pareto-improve upon any x [a, c].
The committee decides policies sequentially with the following timing. First, the current realization of the shock is observed. Then, the chairman makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal x [a, c] . If the proposal is rejected by P , then the status quo persists until the next period. If the proposal is accepted, then x is implemented and becomes the new status quo for the voting game in the next period. The assumption that the chairman makes take-it-or-leaveit proposals to the committee is not meant to be a literal description of how monetary committees actually work. Instead, it is a modeling device that captures the idea that chairmen usually have more power and influence than their peers. 8 Mathematically, the problem of the chairman can be formulated recursively with state given by the initial status quo and the current shock. The Markov strategies of the two agents are defined as follows. The proposal strategy of the chairman is
The voting rule followed by P depends on both the state and the proposal made by C,
In the infinite-horizon game, player's strategies will be stationary. The voting rule is assumed to be sequentially rational. That is, P votes in favor of the proposal whenever the current utility from the proposal plus the continuation value of moving to the next period with a new status quo is higher than or equal to keeping the status quo and moving to the next period with the current status quo. Define the acceptance set A t as the set of policies that are acceptable by P at time t, for a given default policy and a given realization of the state of nature. More formally,
where the sum term is the conditional expectation of the value function V P,t+1 (., ) as of time t. Note that unanimity is required for a policy change only because we are considering a two-person committee. Appendix A shows that our setup is equivalent to a committee with n + 1 representatives where P occupies the role of the median and a simple majority is required to pass a proposal. Let q [a, c] denote the initial status quo. For all t the proposal strategy G C,t (q, i ) solves the dynamic programming problem
In words, C proposes the policy x that maximizes his utility from among those that are acceptable to P . In the noncooperative bargaining environment studied here, the chairman's proposals are never rejected in equilibrium. 9 The latter implication is in line with historical records from the FOMC which show that a chairman's recommendation has never been voted down by the committee (see, Chappell et al., 2005) . The Markov perfect equilibrium of this game is a set of policy rules {G C,t , G P,t } T t=1 , such that: 1) for all t the voting rule G P,t is sequentially rational given {G P,s } T s=t+1 and {G C,s } T s=t ; and 2) for all t the proposal rule G C,t solves the problem of the agenda setter at time t, given {G C,s } T s=t+1 and {G P,s } T s=t .
Finite Horizon with T=1
Consider the voting game described above with finite horizon T = 1. Absent any dynamics, the solution is similar to that of the agenda-setting game studied by Romer and Rosenthal (1978) . The chairman's proposal strategy is depicted in the first column of Figure 2 as a function of the status quo q for each possible realization of . Proposals on the 45 degree line are the status quo.
First, suppose that 1 occurs. In this case, the chairman proposes the status quo for any q [a, c] . The reason is that P would not accept any proposal x (q, c] that gives C higher utility than q, and C would not propose any x [a, q) that gives him lower utility than q. Since the proposal strategy is independent of the values of , p 11 and p 22 , it follows that policy inertia arises in this case only as a result of the heterogeneity among committee members. Now, suppose that 2 occurs and both members agree that b is the optimal value of the policy instrument. In this case, the chairman proposes b starting from any status quo. Notice that the outcome of this (static) game coincides with the first-best.
Finite Horizon with T=2
Suppose now that the horizon is T = 2. The model is solved backwards for t = T, T 1. The proposal strategies at time t = T are the ones derived in Section 2.1. The proposal strategies at time T 1 are derived in Proposition 1 below. In order to develop the reader's intuition, these strategies are depicted in the second column of Figure 
.
Proof:
We start by showing that G C,T 1 (q, 1 ) = q is the optimal proposal rule. Suppose that the current shock is 1 . The chairman's proposal strategy at time t = T 1 is found by exploiting the fact that the successful proposal in T will be given by the proposal rules in Section 2.1. The chairman chooses the proposal x that maximizes his two-period payo 10 The voting records contain information on: the date of the meeting; the policy decision; the names of members in favor of the decision; and the names and preferred policy options of dissenting members. The probabilities are computed as follows. A meeting where the policy decision is adopted unanimously is treated as one where all committee members agree in their preferred instrument value, meaning that in terms of our model = 2 . A meeting with at least one dissenting individual is treated as one where committee members disagree in their preferred instrument value, meaning that = 1 . Then, p 11 (p 22 ) is computed as the number of observations where members disagree (agree) in two consecutive meetings divided by the number of observations where members disagree (agree) in the first of these two meetings. Since the mapping from the voting records to the model is clearly imperfect, the policy rules in Figure 2 are best interpreted as illustrative only. [7] within the acceptance set, A T 1 (q, 1 ). That is, he solves the following problem:
where the acceptance set is defined as
It is easy to see that the acceptance set is [a, q] for any q [a, c]. Since C's two-period payo is increasing in the current proposal, the chairman always proposes x = q. Now we prove that the posited G C,T 1 (q, 2 ) is optimal. When 2 occurs at time T 1, the chairman's problem becomes:
where
In finding G C,T 1 (q, 2 ), it is useful to first derive P 's voting rules. P 's two-period utility is concave in x, with a maximum at
Note that a < z < b. Because the payo is symmetric around z, the acceptance set is easy to derive. For any q [a, z] , A T 1 (q, 2 ) = [q, 2z q] , and for any q [z, c] , A T 1 (q, 2 ) = [2z q, q] . Now consider C's proposal strategy. C's objective function is concave and has a global maximum at
Note that b < y < c. When q [y, c] , C is not constrained and will propose y. When q (2z y, y), C is constrained and proposes his preferred policy in the acceptance set. We distinguish two cases: when q [z, y), the proposal is x = q, and when q (2z y, z), the proposal is x = 2z q. Finally, when q [a, 2z y], the acceptance set includes C's bliss point y and, consequently, C proposes x = y. ¥ Note that the decision rules in period T 1 converge to those in period T as 0 (committee members attach no weight to future payo s) or p 11 , p 22 1 (the states of nature are absorbing): in either case y, z b. We now comment on the policy rules just derived. When 1 occurs and committee members disagree on the optimal instrument value, the proposal at time T 1 is q, irrespective [8] of the current status quo. The status-quo bias originates from the opposite preferences of the two players. In this case, there is no Pareto-improving policy change and the political equilibrium is e cient according to the standard economic definition. To see this, pick any q [a, c] and note that any policy choice to the right (left) of q would reduce P 's (C's) utility. Thus, for the two-state model, the committee implements the first-best in the state of disagreement.
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When 2 occurs and committee members agree that b is the optimal instrument value today, Proposition 1 shows that the proposal at time T 1 is generically di erent from the first-best policy b. For example, when q [y, c] , C adjusts the current policy only to y, which is larger than b. This result is due to the non-zero probability of disagreement in the next meeting: the chairman trades o the benefit of moving towards the ideal point b and the cost of weakening his bargaining power should = 1 in the next period.
To verify the existence of a political failure in equilibrium, consider, for instance, the case where q = y. Rather than staying in y, as established in Proposition 1, a Paretoimproving choice would be moving to b today and going back to y in the next period should polices that Pareto-improve upon those in Proposition 1 can be constructed for all status quo in [a, c] except for {b, 2z b} . (In these two cases, committee decision making implements the first-best because the proposal coincides with b.) Hence, this simple two-state, twoperiod model illustrates the fact that, in some circumstances, committee decision making with an endogenous status quo is ine cient; responses to shocks are more muted compared to situations where there is a single central banker. Since y is increasing in p 12 and , the chairman becomes more cautious as the conditional probability of future disagreement increases and as the future is discounted less heavily by committee members.
While it is di cult to obtain a complete characterization of the proposal rule for an arbitrary period T s, where s denotes the number of remaining periods until T, the result of partial adjustment carries over as T increases. Suppose the status quo at time T s is equal to c. We can show that the committee does not move when 1 occurs and moves to v T s when 2 occurs, where v T s is defined as
Note that v T s = y in the special case where T = 2 and s = 1. If repeated realizations of = 2 take place, the committee moves gradually towards y > b. To see this, note that the sequence {v T s } T 1
s=1 is increasing in s and converges to y as the economy approaches the previous-to-last period. Intuitively, at time T s 1, the chairman is more cautious in moving towards y than at T s because he is more likely to be constrained as a result of the current choice when there are more periods left before the end of the game. Note that today's decision has an e ect on future outcomes only when 1 occurs in the next period, two periods in a row, three periods in a row, etc.
13 However, when there are more periods left before the end of the game, the sum of the probabilities associated with these events is quantitatively larger.
Infinite Horizon
Consider now the voting game in the case where the horizon is infinite. Because finding the analytical solution to the infinite-horizon game is not trivial, we employ instead a numerical algorithm to find the stationary decision rules. The procedure builds on the projection method employed by Judd (1998) to study the Bellman equation of the stochastic growth model, and works by backward induction exploiting the observation that the chairman's problem is a constrained maximization which can be solved numerically using standard hillclimbing methods. See Appendix B for a detailed description of the algorithm. The chairman's stationary decision rules are plotted in the third column of Figure 2 . When = 1 and both members disagree, the chairman simply proposes the status quo. When = 2 , the proposal strategy is qualitatively similar to that derived analytically in Proposition 1 for the horizon T = 2, but the di erence between the proposed policy and the current bliss point is larger. This result follows from the observation that v T s decreases as s . In particular,
Finally, since v w > y z (see Figure 2) , the set of status quo for which the chairman does not propose a policy change is larger in the infinite horizon case.
Multi-State Model
This section solves the dynamic voting game in the more general case where the number of possible shock realizations is larger than two. This extension is important for two reasons. First, it shows that the e cient outcome in the state of disagreement reported in Section 2 is not robust to increasing the number of shock realizations and, consequently, committee policy choices may be ine cient in all states. Second, the two-state model features a strong form of policy inertia in the form of the absorbing region [w, v] and, consequently, it does not permit the derivation of time series implications.
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In what follows, the chairman's proposal strategies are computed, and then policy decisions by the committee are simulated for a sample of sequential meetings.
Proposal Strategies
Assume that the shock can take I discrete values, i for i = 1, 2, . . . , I. Define S = { 1 , 2 , . . . , I }. As before, the shock follows a Markov chain and its I × I transition matrix has elements p ki = prob( k | i ) (0, 1) that satisfy I P k=1 p ki = 1. The shock shifts the agents' preferred policies over a policy set denoted by X. The timing and other features of the model are as described in Section 2. For this more general specification, the Markov strategies of the two agents are defined by
The chairman's proposal strategy G C,t (q, i ) solves the dynamic programming problem
where E t denotes the conditional expectation at time t and the acceptance set is defined as
For concreteness, we focus on the case where I = 6 and maintain the convention that committee members agree in the even states and disagree in the odd states of nature. The In what follows, we characterize the first-best policy for the multi-state version of the model. As before, x i denotes the first-best policy when shock i occurs, with i = 1, ..., 6. Clearly, x 2 = b, x 4 = c, and x 6 = d. Regarding the optimal policies in the odd states, the following risk-sharing conditions must hold:
where < 0 is a constant. That is, the ratio of marginal utilities is equalized across all states of disagreement. For the functional form of the payo function used here,
From this condition it follows that x 1 a = x 3 b = x 5 c, where a x 1 c, b x 3 d, and c x 5 e. To see, for example, that x 1 a = x 3 b, suppose, on the contrary, that x 1 a > x 3 b (x 1 a < x 3 b) and note that in this case both policy makers could augment their payo by lowering (increasing) x 1 and increasing (decreasing) x 3 .
Since the chairman's proposal strategies depend on the matrix of transition probabilities, we conducted extensive experiments with various parameter configurations and report below results for = 0.5 and the transition matrices and B = 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6
. Matrix A was deliberately designed to represent the idea that preferred policies evolve slowly over time as new information about business cycle and inflation variables becomes available. Matrix B is used to show that: 1) committee decision making can generate endogenous autocorrelation in the policy variable even when the states of nature are not autocorrelated; and 2) overshooting may be an outcome of the voting model. Decision rules are respectively plotted in the first and second column of Figure 3 . Proposals on the 45 degree line are the status quo (that is, x = q). 15 The relatively low value of is used to show that dynamic ine ciency arises in the multi-state version of the model even when the future is heavily discounted. Alesina (1987) argues that policy makers' e ective discount rates may be low because reappointment probabilities are less than one. Results from unreported experiments are available from the corresponding author upon request.
[12]
The following implications for committee decision making can be drawn from Figure 3 . First, consider the proposal rules in states of agreement. As before, the chairman proposes instrument values di erent from b, c and d in states 2, 4 and 6, respectively, even though both members agree that these are their current preferred policy options. The intuition for this result is the same as in the two-state model, namely that in a dynamic setup, committee members face a trade-o between the current benefit of choosing their preferred policy and the possible cost of reducing their bargaining power in future meetings. In most cases, the committee partially adjust to shocks that align preferences and, consequently, policy changes are typically smaller than the optimal ones. While policy conservatism is by far the most common outcome, overshooting may arise when drastic changes in the preferred policies are allowed. By overshooting, we refer to the situation where the committee changes the instrument value by more than a single central banker would. Then, policy changes are larger than the optimal ones. An example of overshooting under the transition matrix B is the following. Starting in state = 2 and with a status quo larger than b, note that the chairman proposes a policy less than b, while the single central banker would have adopted b. 16 Note that, like partial adjustment, overshooting is also ine cient because both committee members would increase their current payo by choosing the instrument value they currently prefer. Now consider the proposal rules in states of disagreement. In these cases, there is local policy inertia around previously agreed on decisions. To see this, consider the following example. Starting from state = 2 and instrument value b, suppose there is a "small" change in the state of nature, meaning to either of the adjacent states = 1 or 3 . In these states, members disagree on their preferred instrument value but the chairman's decision rule still implies x = b. Now, suppose there is a "large" change in the state of nature, meaning to = 4 , 5 or 6 . Note that in these cases the proposal will be di erent from the status quo regardless of whether members agree in their desired instrument value or not. An implication of local inertia is that the relation between changes in the state of nature and in policy is nonlinear. In particular, small changes in the state of nature are less likely to produce policy changes compared with larger ones. Empirically, this would mean, for example, that small variations in the rates of inflation and unemployment are less likely to result in a change in the key nominal interest rate, compared with large movements 16 The reason why we observe overshooting with matrix B, but not with matrix A, is the following. The rationale for overshooting and proposing a policy less than b is to have more leverage should = 5 occur and get closer to the ideal point e. The cost of overshooting is that the chairman is worse o if shock 1 occurs, because the agenda setter is stuck with a policy lower than b, when his ideal instrument value is c. Since p 52 = 0 in matrix A, the expected cost of overshooting is larger, and, consequently, overshooting does not occur in equilibrium.
[13] in these variables.
17
In contrast, the standard model with a single central banker, which underlies the derivation of the linear Taylor rule, predicts a proportional change in the policy instrument for any change in inflation and unemployment regardless of their size.
Note that P allows a policy change in the (odd) states of nature where there is disagreement, even when the current default coincides with his preferred policy. For example, when q = a and = 1 occurs, the committee chooses an instrument value closer to c. When the default coincides with his preferred policy, P has significant bargaining power in the current period and, consequently, is willing to accept a policy change to increase his bargaining power in future meetings. 18 This result is not present in the static agenda-setting game of Romer and Rosenthal (1978) . It can only be obtained in a dynamic setup where agents have an incentive to smooth their bargaining power across states by choosing the default for the next meeting. This opportunity is valuable because agents are risk-averse. In absence of commitment, agents strategically modify the (endogenous) default in order to better share risk across states. Clearly, this instrument is imperfect: compared to what is prescribed by the first-best, risk-sharing is not optimal (i.e., the politico-economic equilibrium fails to satisfy the e ciency condition in states of disagreement as well). In some states, one of the two policy makers obtains a high payo while the other su ers a large loss; in some other states, the situation may be reversed. Consequently, there is room for better risk-sharing among committee members.
Simulations
This section simulates committee decision making using an artificial sample of sequential meetings under the multi-state voting model examined above. This exercise is important because it reveals the proposal strategies that are implemented in practice and permits the derivation of time series implications. A series of 200 realizations of the shock were generated using each transition probability matrix (whether A or B). Then, the outcome of the voting game was found using the chairman's proposal strategies in Figure 3 . The simulated series of and x are plotted in Figure 4 . Notice that there is policy smoothing in the sense that the policy variable changes less often than the state of nature. That is, there are many instances where nature changes but the value of the policy variable remains the same. Earlier research by Alesina (1987) and Waller (2000) also finds that policy may display less variance when decisions are made through committees than when they are made by a single individual. However, in this model, policy smoothing is not sustained by the strategic appointment of moderate committee members (as in Waller's model) or by trigger punishments (as in Alesina's model), but by the voting game played by the heterogenous committee. Also, notice that the ergodic process of the policy variable involves a finite number of realizations but they do not correspond to the agreement values (b, c, and d) because of dynamic ine ciency.
From the simulated series, it is possible to construct the frequency histograms for x in Figure 5 .
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From this Figure, it is clear that the most common policy decision by the committee is to set x = 0 despite the fact that the state of nature has changed.
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This result is due to the local inertia implied by the optimal decision rules of committee members which was discussed above. Thus, the voting model can provide an explanation for the observation in Figure 1 whereby the interest rate under the central bank's control is infrequently adjusted, despite the fact that there is new information.
It is important to compare this implication with the one obtained when monetary policy is determined by a single individual, say C. Absent a committee, C's decision rule involves changing the policy variable to his preferred value whenever there is a change in the state of nature. The histograms for this case are plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 5 and show that, in contrast with the data, the outcome x = 0 is relatively infrequent. Figure 6 plots the sample autocorrelation of the policy variable in the model and in the key interest rate from four central banks. First, note that the model endogenously generates positive autocorrelation in the policy variable even when the states of nature are not serially correlated (Matrix B). Second, when the states of nature are persistent (Matrix A), then the predicted autocorrelation may approach that observed in actual data. 21 Instead, the standard model with a single central banker used to derive the Taylor rule does not predict interest rate autocorrelation. Since interest rates are autocorrelated in the data, the empirical analysis of Taylor rules usually involves the addition of lagged interest rates to the theoretical relation (see, for example, Clarida et al., 1999). 19 In order to get a more accurate picture of the distribution, these histograms were constructed using simulations of 10000 observations. 20 Because the transition matrix has a built-in inertia when the diagonal elements are non-zero and in order not to overstate the policy inertia predicted by the voting game, the histograms are plotted using only observations where there is a change in the state of nature.
21 English et al. (2003) reports evidence that the autocorrelation in the U.S. Federal Funds Rate is the result of both policy inertia and shock persistence.
[ 15] This paper shows the existence of a political failure in monetary policy making by committee. However, the fact that a fictional social planner can improve upon committees is no reason to conclude that this institutional arrangement is ine cient. In the real world, the only fair comparison is among political equilibria that can be obtained in the class of available institutions. 22 In order to conclude that a given institution is ine cient, one must
show that there exists another institution that increases the utilities of both policy makers. Unfortunately, this question cannot be answered in a definitive way because, for obvious reasons, the set of feasible institutions cannot be fully characterized.
In this section, we consider an alternative institutional arrangement that is identical to the one we have discussed so far, except for the fact that the default policy is fixed. This shuts down the dynamic link between periods and eliminates the rationale for not implementing the preferred policy in the even states of nature. Figure 7 shows the stationary policy rules when the default is either of the bliss points a through e. These policy rules do not depend on either the status quo or the matrix of transition probabilities. That is, when plotted as a function of q, they are horizontal lines and are the same for any transition matrix. The optimal proposal in the even states of nature is the preferred bliss point for any fixed default, but in the odd states it crucially depends on the location of the default. Table 1 reports the ex-ante (average) payo for each committee member under three alternative institutions: 1) a committee with an evolving default; 2) a committee with a fixed default; and 3) full delegation to C. Table 1 shows that a redistribution of utilities across members is obtained by varying the fixed default. Note that the "average" preferred policies in the states of disagreement for P and C are, respectively, b and d. This is why P (C) obtains a high payo when b (d) is the fixed default. However, the best fixed default for the chairman is policy e. The reason is that this default always gives P a lower payo than C's ideal point. Thus, the chairman has enough bargaining power to propose his preferred point in all states of nature. Having a committee with a fixed default at e is therefore equivalent to an institution where C is the single central banker (see the last column in Table 1 ). Note that while having a fixed default eliminates the dynamic ine ciency in the states of agreement, it does not implement the e cient outcome in the states of disagreement. To see this, suppose, for example, that the fixed default is c. Then, the committee selects c whenever = 1 or = 5 occur. This outcome is clearly ine cient because the utility of both committee members would increase by choosing a policy between the values preferred by P and C. In other words, there is ine cient risk sharing between P and C when the default is fixed. This source of ine ciency is also present in the model with an endogenous default, but it is less severe. The reason is that, when the default is endogenous, committee members can smooth their bargaining power across states of natures and, consequently, insure themselves against the eventuality of having little bargaining power in the next meeting. Now, compare the average payo s under committees with endogenous and fixed defaults. Clearly, an endogenous default lowers the average payo to both members in the even states compared with a fixed default because the policy preferred by both members is not implemented. However, Table 1 shows that starting with an endogenous default, the committee would not agree on amending the institution because any choice of fixed default would lower the ex-ante utility of one of the policy makers. Table 1 also shows that, when the default is endogenous, C obtains a larger share of the surplus when the transition matrix is B rather than A. This is so because the optimal policy changes more drastically when shocks follow matrix B. Since the preferred policy in each period is more likely to be far from the previous policy, the chairman has more leverage in proposing his preferred instrument value.
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Regarding the variance of policy decisions under these institutions, note that a committee with an endogenous status quo generally lowers the variance of both x and x compared with a single central banker and a committee with a fixed default (except when the default is c). This result is a consequence of the local policy inertia introduced by the endogenous status quo.
The absence of an institution that Pareto-dominates an arrangement with an endogenous default can explain its endurance, but it cannot explain why this institutional feature is observed so often in practice. 24 To answer this question, Riboni (2004) shows that, in a model without uncertainty, an endogenous default works as a commitment device and makes credibility problems less severe.
Summary
This paper models monetary policy making as a dynamic non-cooperative game. Committee members sequentially decide the policy for the period after observing the current realization of a preference shock. Depending on the shock, policy makers may agree or disagree about the optimal monetary stance for the period. In this model, the first-best policy can be easily characterized: it satisfies a risk-sharing condition in the states of disagreement and prescribes the preferred policy of both agents in the states of agreement. This paper shows that, in the absence of commitment, committee decision making does not implement the first-best. Ine ciencies arise in all states of nature. In states of agreement, policy makers do not choose the policy they both currently prefer, because they face a trade-o between the benefit of selecting their preferred policy in the current period and the cost of reducing their bargaining power in the future. In states of disagreement, ine ciency is due to incomplete risk-sharing between committee members. Stochastic simulations show that committee decision making 1) induces policy smoothing in the sense that the policy variable changes less often than the state of nature and 2) endogenously generates autocorrelation in interest rates. Finally, we analyze committee decision making with a fixed default and show that this alternative arrangement removes the ine ciency in states of agreement by eliminating the incentive to smooth bargaining power across states. However, compared to a model with endogenous default, a fixed default model delivers more ine cient risk-sharing in the states of disagreement. This may be a probable reason why, despite the ine ciencies described, policy making in practice often features an evolving default. Finally, we emphasize that this paper does not intend to play down the advantages of policy making by committees. We recognize that committee decision making has many desirable attributes. First, previous works show that committees can help overcome credibility problems. Sibert (2003) studies the conditions under which committees have more incentives to build reputation than do individual central bankers. In Dal Bó (2005) , committee decision making under a supermajority voting rule is able to deliver an ideal balance between commitment and flexibility. Second, another body of literature sees information sharing as the main rationale for committee decision making. This argument goes back to the celebrated Condorcet jury theorem. For example, Gerlach-Kristen (2003) shows that in presence of uncertainty about potential output, voting by committees leads to more e cient signal extraction. Experimental studies by Blinder and Morgan (2000) and Lombardelli et al. (2005) provide some support for this conclusion. Notes: The numbers in this Table were computed using 10000 simulations.
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B Algorithm to Solve for Stationary Decision Rules
Step 1. Starting at time t = T , solve the chairman's optimization problem for a set of discrete nodes n j , for j = 1, 2, . . . , N in [a, c], given the shock = i , for i = 1, 2. The nodes n j may be interpreted as possible status quo at the beginning of period T. Given n j and i , the chairman's problem at time t = T is V C,T (n j , i ) = max
subject to the nonlinear constraint U P (x, i ) U P (n j , i ). This maximization problem is solved numerically for each n j and i using a hill-climbing method. The result is a collection of 2N optimal proposal values G C,T (n j , i ). Using these optimal values, compute V C,T (n j , i ) = U C (G C,T (n j , i ), i ) and V P,T (n j , i ) = U P (G C,T (n j , i ), i ) for all n j and i .
Step 2. For each i , approximate the continuous value function V C,T (q, i ) using a Chebyshev polynomial of order N 1. The polynomial coe cients are obtained from the Least Squares projection of V C,T (n j , i ) on a constant and the first N 1 members of the Chebyshev polynomial family. At the N nodes q = n j , the Chebyshev polynomial fits V C,T (q, i ) exactly. For points q 6 = n j , the value of V C,T (q, i ) is computed by interpolation (i.e, by evaluating the Chebyshev polynomial at q). For each i , the value function V P,T (q, i ) is approximated likewise.
Step 3. Move backwards one period. For each possible status quo n j and each possible shock realization i , solve numerically the chairman's problem V C,t (n j , i ) = max
where the value functions are replaced by their respective approximating polynomials. The result is a collection of 2N optimal proposal values G C,t (n j , i ). Using these optimal values, compute V C,t (n j , i ) and V P,t (n j , i ) for all n j and i .
Step 4. Repeat Steps 2 and 3 backwards until the chairman's decision rules converge. ¥
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